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Terrorist group rivalries and alliances have important consequences, but the sources of these 
relationships are debated. This paper offers a side-by-side examination of correlates of terrorist 
rivalries and alliances. Global analyses of hundreds of terrorist groups find violent rivalry is 
associated with drug trafficking, state sponsorship, ethnic motivation, and operating in a civil 
conflict country. Alliances are associated with territorial control, intermediate membership size, 
and religious motivation. The idea that alliances are an indicator of weakness does not find much 
support. When relationships are disaggregated into theoretically-relevant categories (inter-field 
and intra-field rivalries, and domestic and international alliances), further distinctions appear. 
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Some terrorist groups attack each other in violent rivalries, while other terrorist groups 
form alliances to train or carry out attacks together. Terrorist group rivalries and alliances affect 
group lethality, tactical choices, longevity, and other outcomes.1 According to data used in this 
paper, about 15 percent of terrorist groups have had a violent rival at some point, and almost half 
of the groups have had an ally. Other authors find similar rates of participation.2 However, 
debates continue regarding why some terrorist groups form such relationships, while others do 
not. What types of terrorist groups attack other terrorists? What kinds of terrorist groups form 
alliances with other groups? 
Interorganizational ties between terrorist groups are puzzling because there are reasons 
why we should expect groups to remain isolated. Regarding violent rivalry, these types of 
relationships seem counterproductive. Terrorist organizations focus energy on each other instead 
of the state. This can destroy involved groups, as happened to several Tamil separatist groups in 
Sri Lanka in the 1980s.3 Abrahms cites “terrorist fratricide” as one of the chief puzzles of 
terrorism, and it is one of the phenomena that lead him to argue that terrorists are not strategic 
actors.4 Regarding alliances, they seem potentially disadvantageous as well, as other authors have 
explained.5 Clandestine actors usually do not have a reliable third party, such as a government or 
international organization, to help enforce agreements. Additionally, teaming up with other 
groups could draw increased counterterrorism attention. Related to this, alliances could escalate 
the risk of counterterrorism success against groups because if one group is infiltrated, security 
services could find out information about its partner groups as well. These reasons might explain 
why some groups, such as Peru’s Sendero Luminoso, have mostly refused to work with other 
terrorist organizations.6 
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The literature offers contrasting explanations for militant group relationships, as is 
discussed in more detail below. Some work only looks at relationships among rebel groups in 
civil wars. It is unclear if the findings from these studies should be applicable to groups that use 
terrorism, whether in a civil war context or outside of it. Regarding relationships among terrorist 
groups specifically, it seems that much of this work is dyadic in nature, with interesting results 
such as the finding that groups with the same ideology or a common target are likely to align.7 
The dyadic focus is also used for rebel groups, analyzing the role of relative power between the 
groups.8 However, we know little about monadic attributes – characteristics any terrorist group 
might have on its own – that could explain either violent rivalry or alliances. This paper seeks to 
complement the extant research by considering arguments that exist in the literature and offering 
the first side-by-side quantitative global tests of assertions about rivalrous and alliance 
relationships.  
The next section considers the research on relationships among terrorist groups, and 
presents arguments for why some groups have such relationships. It emphasizes resource-based 
arguments. The empirical section discusses the data used, and the analyses are conducted on a 
global data set of terrorist groups, 1987-2005. Results suggest violent rivalries are associated 
with involvement in the drug business, state sponsorship, ethnic motivation, operating in a 
democratic country, and operating in a country with a civil war. In contrast with some research, 
territorial control is not associated with violent rivalry (but see below). Factors associated with 
terrorist group alliances include controlling territory, intermediate group membership levels, and 
religious motivation. Despite arguments that alliances are a sign of weakness, evidence is mixed 
at best regarding this notion. When relationships are disaggregated by theoretically-relevant 
categories, inter-field and intra-field rivalries as well as domestic and international alliances, 
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interesting contrasts appear. For example, inter-field rivalries are negatively associated with 
territorial control, while intra-field rivalries are positively associated with territorial control. 
Additionally, international terrorist group alliances are associated with state sponsorship, while 
domestic terrorist group alliances are not. The conclusion discusses shortcomings of the study 
and mentions avenues for future research that could draws on the findings. 
  
Terrorist group ties and possible explanations 
 Terrorism can be defined as the threat or use of violence by subnational actors to obtain a 
political or social goal through intimidation of a wider audience beyond their immediate victims.9 
This manuscript uses a broad understanding of “terrorist groups,” but one that is consistent with 
many studies in the literature: Terrorist groups are subnational political organizations that use 
terrorism.10 In recent years, as global data has become available, scholars have increasingly 
sought to understand the behavior of organizations that use terrorism.11 A substantial number of 
these studies have examined consequences of terrorist group interactions. There has been less 
research, however, into the formation of these relationships, or even description of their global 
patterns. This section discusses some basics of terrorist group relationships and then explains 
why some group attributes might be related to relationship involvement. 
 Two types of relationships are frequently discussed in terrorism research: rivalry and 
alliances. Terrorist groups sometimes attack each other, and when this is a regular occurrence 
between two groups, it is a violent rivalry. This is related to what some other authors refer to as 
“competition.”12 However, this paper uses a more specific term to imply direct violent 
interaction, not only groups disagreeing with each other, or coexisting in the same space and 
indirectly vying for resources. Violent rivalry is consistent with what civil war scholars call 
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“fratricide,” although they also use this term for within-group violence.13 Hafez puts intergroup 
fratricide at the extreme end of his spectrum of competitive factionalism possible among rebel 
groups, because a great deal of intergroup competition remains non-violent.14 For the purposes of 
this manuscript, only rivalry between terrorist organizations, as opposed to terrorists and other 
actor-types (e.g., criminal organizations or informal networks), is considered.  
 Within violent rivalry, there are intra-field and inter-field rivalries.15 Some competitors 
have the same overall political motivation or ideology, such as communism, representing a 
particular ethnic group, or Salafism. As an example, Tamil separatist militant groups battled each 
other in Sri Lanka, and these were intra-field violent rivalries. Other rivals have substantially 
different views, such as left-wing vs. right-wing, representing one ethnic group vs. representing 
another, or Sunni vs. Shia. These are inter-field rivalries.  
Another common type of terrorist group relationship is cooperation. There are many types 
of terrorist cooperation, as Moghadam details.16 This manuscript focuses on a commonly-
discussed type of cooperation, alliances. I define terrorist group alliances as logistical or 
operational cooperation between two or more terrorist organizations. Examples include when one 
group trains another, or when two groups jointly conduct an attack. This is generally consistent 
with definitions or operationalizations used by other authors.17 This material notion of alliances 
(as opposed to sharing ideas, or only verbal support) is consistent with the International Relations 
literature on alliances between countries, with the exception that international alliances are often 
written down, while alliances among terrorist organizations are usually informal in that the terms 
of the relationship are not inscribed.18 As with rivalries, alliances here only refer to relationships 
involving terrorist groups. Coordination between terrorist groups and other actor types (e.g., non-
violent political parties, informal networks) is beyond the scope of the current study.19 Alliances 
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can involve groups of the same country, domestic alliances, or groups from different countries, 
international alliances.20 
Rivalrous and alliance relationships have occurred in diverse environments around the 
world. Regarding rivalries, sometimes violent competition starts when a “reactionary” group 
forms to attack an extant group with opposing political goals. The Autodefensas in Colombia, 
which formed to attack the FARC and other leftist groups, are an example.21 Loyalist groups in 
Northern Ireland are another.22 What seems to be more common, however, is when multiple 
terrorist groups claim to represent the same ethnic group, and attack each other. This has been 
evident between terrorist organizations purporting to fight for Catholics in Northern Ireland, 
Palestinians, Tamils, Kurds, and other ethnopolitical groups.23 This “dual contest,” groups 
fighting the government as well as each other, has been widely observed in civil war contexts.24 
Terrorist group rivalries have important consequences. They can encourage terrorist 
groups to innovate, to try to find ways to stand out. Bloom argues that this “outbidding” is why 
groups in competitive situations sometimes adopt the tactic of suicide terrorism.25 Some studies 
suggest competition between terrorist groups results in more terrorism, and more shocking types 
of attacks.26 Other consequences of rivalry include the possibility that the groups get into a spiral 
of escalating tit-for-tat violence, shifting the nature of conflict from an anti-government struggle 
to sectarian war. In civil wars, greater factional competition can lead to more civilian deaths.27 
Finally, rivals can spoil negotiations between the state and a terrorist group or groups.28 
Regarding alliances, many terrorist groups have trained together, shared logistic 
networks, or carried out joint attacks. A prominent example is al-Qaeda, which has been a 
participant in many interorganizational connections. Many other terrorist groups have teamed up 
with other organizations. Hamas has basically had terrorist group allies ever since its founding in 
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the 1980s, and the Colombian group April 19 Movement (M-19) cooperated with other Latin 
American groups. Alliances do not only happen among groups with similar political goals. For 
example, Palestinian nationalist terrorist organizations collaborated with European terrorist 
groups of diverse motivations – nationalist, left-wing, and right-wing.29 However, other studies 
find that generally groups with the same motivations are more likely to form alliances.30  
When terrorist groups align, they can share resources, spread information, and perhaps 
increase their capabilities.31 Alliances help terrorist groups access new technology and tactics.32 
Several studies find that groups with allies tend to be much more lethal than those without, and 
they also tend to survive longer than other groups.33 Perhaps for these reasons, terrorist group 
alliances occur in diverse settings. 
Overall, both alliances and violent rivalry occur regularly, involve a broad variety of 
groups, and substantially affect the involved groups and other actors. What factors are associated 
with group involvement in of violent rivalries or alliances?  
 
Explanations of violent rivalry 
Some case studies offer explanations of why rivalry or alliances occurred in a specific 
setting, or with a particular type of group, such as jihadists.34 Research on militant group rivalry 
seems to focus on consequences more than causes, for example looking at how competition leads 
to tactical innovation, certain conflict outcomes, or ethnic defection.35 Other work looks at a 
related concept, group fragmentation.36 Some work is inherently dyadic, such as Hafez’s 
argument about ideological distance within a dyad, among other factors, explaining rivalry 
dynamics.37  
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In contrast to trying to explain rivalry of certain types of groups, or dyadically, this 
section considers monadic factors that could be associated with rivalry among any terrorist 
organizations. The framework underlying the discussion of rivalry explanations is resource 
competition. Terrorist groups depend on resources such as recruits, money, and arms.38 The 
mobilization of these resources is essential for organizational survival and success,39 so the 
following factors are examined: holding territory, involvement in the illegal drug business, and 
state sponsorship. Competition related to group political motivations, particularly regarding 
ethnopolitical motivations, is also discussed. Ethnopolitical groups have ties to a certain set of 
people, and often land, so this implies particular patterns regarding resources, as is discussed 
below. 
When organizations that use terrorism control territory, this provides possible points of 
contention with other terrorist groups.40 Territory can provide income to groups through various 
forms, such as extortion or exploiting natural resources. Groups then fight over these sources of 
funds. For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation 
Army have attacked each other repeatedly. One point of contention, at least in the early 2000s, 
was that the FARC was upset the ELN was not sharing extortion proceeds.41 Similarly, 
Woldemariam argues that changes in territorial control are fundamental for explaining factional 
infighting within rebel movements.42 Controlling territory also means the groups depend on the 
public for support, and this, too can be a basis for disagreements, including violent competition.43 
The group controlling the territory might defend the people living there from other groups,44 
which can turn into interorganizational violence. Through a number of causal mechanisms, then, 
terrorist groups occupying territory should be likely to engage in violent rivalry.      
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Many terrorist organizations are involved in the drug trade, whether production, 
transportation, or sales of illegal drugs. This has been an important source of funds for a diverse 
set of groups such as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army in Myanmar, the Taliban, and the 
Ulster Volunteer force. Just as holding territory can lead to intergroup competition and violence, 
the drug trade is also the source of violence between terrorist organizations. The stakes are high 
in such a lucrative market, and just as drug cartels fight over trade routes and market share, so do 
terrorist organizations. Fjelde and Nilsson examine groups involved in civil conflict, and find that 
rivalries are more likely among groups involved in trafficking or production of illegal drugs.45 
Examples abound of rebel groups fighting over the drug industry, such as in Colombia or 
Myanmar. Beyond groups in civil wars, it seems likely that involvement in the drug business 
affects the wider category of groups that use terrorism, given the valuable market associated with 
these products. Terrorist groups involved with illegal drugs should be especially likely to engage 
in violent rivalries with other groups.  
State sponsorship is a substantial source of resources for many terrorist organizations.46 
During the Cold War, the United States supported groups such as the Contras in Nicaragua, and 
the Soviet Union and its allies supported organizations like the Red Brigades in Italy and 
Germany’s Red Army Faction. Beyond the Cold War, Libya supported terrorist organizations for 
decades. More recently, Syria, Pakistan, Iran, and other states continue to fund groups that use 
terrorism.47 State sponsorship can lead to intergroup rivalry for several reasons. First, the relative 
wealth of this group can lead to problems with other terrorist organizations, as occurs with other 
resources such as those mentioned above. Second, the state might want to use the group it is 
sponsoring to attack a rival state,48 or a group that is a proxy for the rival state. Hezbollah has 
attacked enemies of Iran, its sponsor, for example. Note that it is not necessarily the case that 
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sponsorship “causes” rivalry. Rivalry might follow from sponsorship, but a state also might 
choose to fund a group because that group had already been attacking the state’s enemy. 
Regardless of which occurs first, it seems likely that state sponsorship and rivalry often go 
together.  
A final possible source of rivalry has to do with the political goals of the group. Research 
shows that differences in motivations can lead to substantial differences in outcomes related to 
terrorist groups.49 Some terrorist groups are primarily motivated by a claim related to an ethnic 
group, a group of people with a distinctive and enduring identity, based on cultural traits and 
other attributes.50 Sometimes violence among ethnically motivated terrorist organizations is 
simple sectarian violence, inter-field rivalry among distinct groups – conflict between Loyalists 
and Republicans in Northern Ireland, for example. (Experts generally consider violence of the 
Troubles more ethnic than religious.51)  
Intra-field conflict also occurs with ethnically motivated militant groups seeking to 
represent the same community, such as Palestinians or Tamils.52 This type of rivalry is often 
competition for resources such as donations and recruits.53 Byman argues that almost all 
ethnically motivated terrorist groups raise funds from their own community.54 This occurs 
through both donations and extortion, although the line between the two is not always clear. In 
general, diaspora support for militant groups can be quite lucrative, contributing to their success 
against the state.55 While battles for resources (including donations and recruits) are common 
among terrorist organizations, intra-field rivalry also occurs due to differences between 
moderates and relative extremists wanting to represent the ethnic group.56 A substantial literature 
shows that disputes involving groups from the same ethnic groups are widespread.57 Any type of 
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terrorist group could be involved in a violent rivalry, but they seem especially likely among 
ethnically motivated groups. 
 
Explanations of alliances 
A number of studies theorize sources of terrorist group alliances. Bapat and Bond look at 
the conditions under which militant groups form particular types of alliances, such as symmetric 
or asymmetric.58 Bacon offers an in-depth analysis of the subject, and argues that a great deal of 
alliances are explained by “alliance hubs,” groups such as al Qaeda, the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, and ISIS, which align with many other groups.59 A shared enemy and 
shared ideology help with partner selection, Bacon argues, but hubs are the crucial element. To 
complement this argument, however, how else can we explain terrorist group alliances more 
generally, including the instances that do not involve hubs? Consistent with Bacon’s argument, 
Asal and co-authors find that terrorist groups that share ideologies and are targeting the same 
country are more likely to align.60 While network and dyadic phenomena are certainly important, 
monadic factors also contribute to explaining terrorist group alliances. 
This section focuses on the following factors likely to affect terrorist group alliances: 
Holding territory, state sponsorship, group membership size, and religious motivation. The first 
three factors are important because they are indicative of organizational resources. Groups with 
such resources are seen as valuable partners by other terrorist groups. They have the capacity to 
provide resources to other groups, and the capacity to reach out to groups on the other side of the 
country, region, or world. Religious motivation is also related to organizational resources. 
Religious groups, often focused on spectacular attacks (see below), are especially likely to draw 
on alliances to aggregate resources so they can carry out these attacks.  
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Holding territory is a crucial element of militant group power, as discussed earlier. 
Groups that hold territory tend to kill more people than other groups, for example.61 Territory 
indicates capacity, but also needs. Groups holding territory might be able to supply resources to 
other terrorist organizations, and they might also need to turn to others for help with security, 
weapons, training, or other necessities. In short, groups so powerful are unlikely to be able to be 
isolated. One more specific way in which possessing territory can be associated with intergroup 
alliances is through training camps. An example is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which 
harbored and trained members of other groups, such as al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, in their 
camps.62 The training facilities in al Qaeda territory in Afghanistan in the 1990s were also crucial 
for forging and maintaining relationships with other groups. Holding territory can be a key asset 
for a terrorist group hub, as it can offer a safe haven, training grounds, or other resources to its 
alliance partners.63  
State sponsorship could also be important for explaining intergroup alliances. Funds from 
governments are resources that terrorist groups can use to support other organizations, through 
joint training, joint attacks, or simply providing weapons or other goods to their partners. Beyond 
this type of resource motivation for terrorist group alliances, sponsorship could be related to 
group alliances because of the desires of the funding country. As with sponsorship and rivalry, it 
is not always the case that sponsorship “causes” terrorist group alliances. However, relationships 
with sponsors and with other terrorist groups can influence and bolster each other. Iran has 
supported both Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which in turn cooperate with each 
other.64 The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence has reportedly supported groups such as 
Lashkar e Taiba and Hizb ul Mujahideen, which have worked together.65 During the Cold War, 
patterns of state sponsorship overlapped with networks of terrorist organizations, whether in 
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Central America, Western Europe, or beyond. This suggests state sponsorship might be 
especially associated with international alliances as opposed to domestic alliances. The notion 
that state sponsorship could be associated with group alliances is consistent with Bond’s 
argument that group financial independence is negatively related to alliance formation.66  
An additional indicator of potential alliances is group size. Some terrorist groups have a 
handful of members, while others have hundreds or more. The literature suggests contrasting 
possibilities regarding the relationship between group size and alliance membership. One view is 
that larger groups are simply more visible, and thus likely to attract potential alliance partners. 
Given that group size is an indicator of group strength,67 it seems probable that stronger groups 
will be able to reach out, forge, and maintain alliances. Alliances often involve resource sharing, 
whether through joint training, sharing weapons, or even giving money to another group. Larger 
groups are better equipped to contribute to such a relationship. Alliance hubs, for example, have 
all been relatively large groups.  
The notion that larger group size could be associated with alliances is debatable because 
some scholars build on inter-state alliance theory to argue that terrorist group alliances are 
affected by perceptions of threat – groups form alliances to balance out a more powerful actor.68 
This is analogous to studies of military alliances between states, which often suggest that the 
primary function of these alliances is to pool resources against some other actor.69 If this 
capability aggregation motivation was the case generally, we might think that weaker (smaller) 
groups are more likely to form alliances than more powerful (bigger) groups. Indeed, some 
analysts and news accounts have suggested that terrorist group alliance involvement is a sign of 
weakness.70 This is consistent with Jackson and colleagues’ research on terrorist group learning, 
which suggests that smaller groups are unlikely to have enough knowledge on their own, and 
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need to communicate with external sources – such as other terrorist groups – to compensate for 
their own resource limitations.71   
In a third possibility about the relationship between terrorist group size and alliance 
participation, Bond argues that mid-sized groups are the most likely to form alliances.72 She 
suggests that large (powerful) groups are desirable alliance partners, but they do not have great 
incentives to join alliances since they already have substantial capabilities. Small groups, on the 
other hand, will want allies, but others will not see them as worthwhile partners given their low 
levels of capabilities. Intermediate-sized terrorist groups, however, have the right mix of 
incentives to align and attractiveness to other partners. Empirical tests can help sort out whether it 
is larger, smaller, or mid-sized terrorist groups which are especially likely to participate in 
alliances. 
 A final factor possibly associated with terrorist group alliances is religious motivation. 
Religious terrorism, perhaps more than any other type of terrorism, is widely argued to be 
unique.73 Rapoport noted similarities among terrorists motivated by their Hindu, Muslim, or 
Jewish faith.74 Stern suggests religious terrorists are often driven by a desire to “purify the 
world,” which distinguishes them from other terrorists.75 Hoffman argues that religious terrorists, 
as opposed to secular terrorists, have “radically different value systems, mechanisms of 
legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichaean world views.”76 Empirical 
work, including recent work, finds important differences between groups motivated by religion 
and those with other motivations.77 The relatively unique motivations of religious terrorists have 
implications for their demands for resources, and as a result interactions with other terrorists.         
Religious terrorist groups do not seem to have the same level of concern that other 
terrorist groups do regarding minimizing fatalities, to maintain a degree of political legitimacy.78 
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Religious groups are more content with violence as an end than other groups are, and tend to kill 
far more people than other groups.79  Jihadist groups are a prominent example of this, with their 
dominance of suicide bombing, but in general religious groups are more violent than non-
religious groups.80 Allies are an important factor behind terrorist group lethality – even when 
taking into consideration religious motivations.81 Alliances help groups share that enable them to 
attack in more sophisticated ways, and ultimately kill more people.82 Because of the combination 
of reduced concern about negative consequences of excessive violence and the greater incentives 
to align to bring about such violence, religious terrorist groups should often be cooperative with 
other terrorists.   
 
Empirics 
To empirically evaluate the arguments regarding terrorist group relationships while taking 
other possible explanations into consideration, analyses are conducted on a data set of terrorist 
groups active at any point between 1987 and 2005. The data are a combination of the terrorist 
group alliance data and violent rivalry data that I previously published separately.83 These data 
sets were built using a modified version of Asal and Rethemeyer’s group data that covered 1998-
2005 as a starting point,84 and I gathered data on groups existing as early as 1987, and updated 
some variables as described below. The Asal and Rethemeyer data was cross-sectional, but when 
I gathered information on groups from earlier years, I also coded some temporal changes in 
variables such as the terrorist group relationships. However, the present study uses a cross-
section, as did Asal and Rethemeyer, because most organizational independent variables have 
little or no variation over time.85  
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The groups in the data from 1998 or later are the groups from the Asal and Rethemeyer 
data.86 Groups from earlier years are those identified in other terrorist group databases, primarily 
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) and the GTD 
terrorist incident data set.87 For years before 1998, I coded variables using terrorist group 
databases such as GTD TOPS, as well as newspaper archive searches, books, and other sources. 
The Lexis-Nexis database was searched for all news articles about each group. These open 
sources contain a great deal of information about terrorist groups, as terrorist almost by definition 
publicize their acts – including, often, with whom they act.  
  The study uses several dependent variables. The primary dependent variables are 
dichotomous measures of terrorist group violent rivalries and alliances. A terrorist group is coded 
for Violent rival when another terrorist group physically attacks it or its supporters, or vice 
versa.88 78, or about 14 percent, of the groups are coded as having a violent rival. A terrorist 
group is coded for Alliance when it has shared efforts logistically or operationally with another 
terrorist organization. This refers to sharing resources, including joint training and joint attacks. 
This is consistent with the definition of terrorist group alliances discussed by other authors.89 
This definition excludes mere verbal support because material cooperation is more likely to be 
consequential. 236, or about 42 percent of groups are coded as being in an alliance.  
Dichotomous measures, as opposed to count measures, are used because the argument is 
about what is associated with having a relationship or not – and not about what explains having 
an additional or many relationships. Additionally, many have neither adversaries nor allies, so the 
difference between 0 and 1 is of particular interest, as opposed to, for example, the difference 
between a second and a third ally. Goodness-of-fit measure suggest that models with binary 
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dependent variables offer a better fit than count models. These variables were coded using 
sources as described above. 
For more nuanced understanding of intergroup relationships, additional models also look 
at disaggregated versions of rivalry and alliances. Rivalry is broken down into inter-field and 
intra-field rivalries, as discussed previously. These dichotomous variables come from my data on 
rivalries, and are based on whether the groups are from the same overall ideological “field,” or 
have competing motivations, such as left vs. right, Sunni vs. Shia, or pro-government vs. 
insurgent.90 Intra-field rivalries are more common. Of the 558 groups used in the main models, 
27 are coded as having an inter-field rival, while 55 have an intra-field rival. Alliances are 
divided by those between groups of the same country, and groups from different countries. A 
group is coded “1” for Domestic alliance if it is in at least one alliance with a group from its own 
country, and it is coded “1” for international alliance if it is in an alliance with a group from 
another country. There are more groups with domestic alliances (198) than those with 
international alliances (91).  
Territory is a variable coded 1 if there is evidence of the group controlling territory. To be 
coded for this, a group should exercise physical control of a substantial part of a country, such as 
an entire city or swath of rural land large enough for open camps, and the ability to prevent 
government forces from entering this territory, for an extended period of time. About 16 percent 
of groups are coded as controlling territory. Drugs is a binary variable coded 1 if evidence is 
found of organizational involvement in the illegal drug trade, whether production, transportation, 
or sales. About 7 percent of groups, 45, are coded as having such involvement. State sponsorship 
is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for groups receiving material support from a government. 
About 16 percent of groups are coded as being state sponsored. The sources for these variables 
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are the same sources as other variables, such as systematic newspaper archive searches, as 
described in Asal and Rethemeyer’s work and my previous articles.91 
Group size approximates the number of members in a terrorist group. It is an ordinal 
variable coded 0 if the group has fewer than 100 members, 1 if the group has between 100 and 
999 members, 2 if the group has between 1,000 and 9,999 members, and 3 for the few groups 
with 10,000 or more members. This is not as precise of a measure as we might prefer, but it is the 
best that is available given the scarcity of information on terrorist group size. The most common 
value is 0, fewer than 100 members.  
The group motivation measures are Ethnic motivation and Religious motivation, 
dichotomous measures indicating terrorist groups that have goals related to ethnicity or religion, 
respectively. Around 35 percent of terrorist groups are coded for Ethnic. About 23 percent are 
coded for religious. These codings are not exclusive of other motivations, such as leftist or 
rightist, nor are they mutually exclusive. This broad coding, including groups that have additional 
motivations, is used because the argument is about groups with a religious or ethnic claim, not 
necessarily groups that do not have any other additional motivation. The sources for these 
variables are the same as for the other group variables. Group age is the age in years based on the 
end year of the group (or 2005 if it was still extant at the end of that year) minus its start year. 
This is discussed more in the source articles for the data, which deal with terrorist group 
longevity.   
Models also include country-level attributes as control variables. Each terrorist group is 
coded for the county in which they are primarily located. One country-level factor that indicates 
opportunities to form relationships is the number of terrorist groups operating in the same 
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country. Groups in country is a count measuring the total number of terrorist groups in the 
country of the group being analyzed.  
A proxy of state capacity, Country GDPPC, takes into consideration that certain states 
have more resources, including resources that could be used for counterterrorism. This measure is 
particularly relevant for models of alliances, because groups might form alliances to counteract 
especially capable states.92 Country GDPPC measures gross domestic product per capita in 
thousands of 2005 dollars. The source is Penn World Tables, via the Quality of Government 
project.93 This is a standard, though not ideal, state capability proxy. Fearon and Laitin use it as a 
measure of “a state’s overall financial, administrative, police, and military capabilities.”94    
Population, a natural logarithm, is included to capture otherwise unmeasured dynamics 
within states. For example, terrorist groups tend to last longer in more populous states.95 
Additionally, it is possible that Groups in country undercounts terrorist organizations due to their 
clandestine nature, but more populous countries are likely to have more terrorist groups, so 
Population takes this into consideration.96 Population comes from the Penn World Tables.  
Models also include Democracy, measured by the Quality of Government’s variable that 
uses an average of Freedom House and Polity data.97 When Polity data is missing, the measure 
imputes based on Freedom House. It is a 0-10 measure, where 10 indicates a highly democratic 
country. Democracy is included because it has been shown to have important consequences for 
terrorism.98 Models also include Physical integrity rights, from the CIRI project.99 It captures to 
what extent the state is free from physical integrity violations such as disappearances, with a 
possible value of 0-8, where 8 indicates freedom from four types of violations. Repression is an 
important part of the terrorism literature, and it could reduce the abilities of groups to form 
relationships, or possibly spur them to form alliances. This concept is distinct from Democracy, 
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and the two variables are not highly correlated.100 Models also include Civil conflict to take into 
consideration if the country is ever engaged in sustained internal armed conflict. This is a 
dichotomous variable and it comes from UCDP data.101 Finally, models also include regional 
dummy variables, and the omitted category is the Middle East. Given the binary nature of the 
dependent variables, logistic regression is used. For a more rigorous test of the hypotheses, 
models are estimated with robust standard errors.102 
     
Findings 
Table 1 reports the results of models. Rivalry is discussed first. Territory is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting a lack of support for the notion that a terrorist group holding territory is 
associated with its likelihood of having a rival. This contrasts with Fjelde and Nilsson’s study of 
rebel groups, which found territorial control associated with inter-group violence. Drugs is 
statistically significant and positively signed, suggesting that group involvement in the illegal 
drug trade is associated with group participation in violent rivalry. This is consistent with 
expectations. Similarly, State sponsored is statistically significant and positively signed. Groups 
with a state sponsor are more likely than groups without a state sponsor to be involved in violent 
rivalry. None of the three membership size variables are statistically significant, suggesting 
different group sizes are not associated with rivalry.  
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
Ethnic motivation is statistically significant and positively associated with violent rivalry, 
suggesting this type of group motivation is associated with intergroup violence. Religious 
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motivation is not associated with violent rivalry in either model, presenting an interesting contrast 
across group motivations – and with the alliance results. Both Age and Age squared are 
statistically significant. Age is positively signed, while Age squared is negatively signed, 
suggesting a non-linear relationship between age and the likelihood of a group being in a rivalry. 
As groups get older, they are more likely to have a rival, but this effect decreases at higher ages.  
 Some state-level variables return interesting associations with violent rivalry. Groups in 
country is not statistically significant, suggesting the extent to which the environment or 
“market” is crowded is not associated with the likelihood of rivalry. Country GDPPC is 
associated with violent rivalry. This suggests terrorist groups operating in wealthier countries are 
more likely to have a violent rival. This is perhaps not an intuitive finding, but it might be driven 
by the many rivalries among groups in Northern Ireland and Israel (Palestinian Territories). 
Country population is statistically insignificant. Democracy is statistically significant, suggesting 
rivalrous relationships are more common in more democratic countries. It could be that groups 
needs some freedom to be able to attack their peers, and this is more feasible in societies with 
more civil liberties. Alternately, democracies are said to be likely to give concessions to 
terrorists, and this could cause groups to fight over negotiation terms. The results for Intra-field 
rivalry below shed more light on this possibility.      
Physical integrity rights is statistically significant and negatively signed, suggesting as 
countries increasingly protect physical integrity rights of their citizens, rivalries are less likely. 
This seems to contradict the Democracy finding, but as noted earlier, these variables are not 
highly correlated and thus represent different aspects of rights. This is worthy of further 
investigation. Civil conflict is statistically significant and positively associated with violent 
rivalry in both models, suggesting terrorist groups in countries that have had civil conflicts are 
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more likely to have rivals. Of the region variables, only Asia has a statistically significant 
coefficient, suggesting groups in this region are more likely than groups in the Middle East, the 
omitted category, to have rivals. Some countries in Asia with group rivalries include India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (in the 1980s).  
 Regarding the alliance model, Model 2, Territory is associated with having an alliance. 
This is consistent with expectations. Drugs and State sponsorship are statistically insignificant. 
This is an interesting contrast with the violent rivalry results. Of the membership size measures, 
the variable representing 100-999 members is statistically significant and positively. This 
suggests groups with between 100 and 999 members are more likely than groups with less than 
100 members (the omitted category) to have a rival. This is interesting because size is often a 
measure of group strength, so this finding goes against notions that alliances are a sign of 
weakness. The result is consistent with Bond’s notion of intermediate-sized groups being 
especially likely to participate in alliances. The 100-999 group member category could be 
considered “intermediate” since very few (<5%) of the groups are in the largest category. 
Effectively there are three categories, the middle of which is 100-999 members. 
Ethnic motivation is statistically insignificant, but Religious motivation is statistically 
significant and positively signed, suggesting religious groups are more likely than other types of 
groups to be in alliances. This is consistent with expectations. The ethnic and religious findings 
regarding alliances jointly present an interesting divergence from the violent rivalry findings. Age 
and Age squared are both statistically significant, positively and negatively signed respectively, 
suggesting a nonlinear relationship similar to what was seen with violent rivalry. 
 Terrorist group cooperation is not associated with many state-level variables. Groups in 
country is statistically significant and positively signed (although only marginally significant, 
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p<.10). This suggests that if a group is in a country with a higher number of terrorist groups, it is 
more likely to have an ally. This is intuitive. Country GDPPC, Population (log), and Democracy 
are all statistically insignificant. Group-level variables seem to better explain group alliances. The 
lack of significance for Country GDPPC is interesting because state per capita wealth is often a 
measure of state capacity, and the insignificance suggests a lack of support for the notion that 
groups facing stronger states are more likely to join alliances.  
Physical integrity rights is statistically significant and negatively signed. The more that a 
state respects physical integrity rights, for example refraining from “disappearing” citizens, the 
less likely a terrorist group in that country is to align with another group. Perhaps group alliances 
are more helpful when groups face repression, so groups can team up against the state. This is the 
only hint of support for the capability aggregation model of alliance participation. Civil conflict is 
statistically insignificant, which is another difference with the rivalry results. None of the 
regional variables are statistically significant in Model 2, suggesting there is no difference 
between groups in these regions and those of the Middle East (the omitted category) in terms of 
the likelihood of alliance participation. 
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
Marginal effects (see Figure 1) are used to calculate substantive significance of variables 
in Table 1, the primary models. Regarding violent rivalry, involvement in the illegal drug 
business is associated with a 7 percent increase in the likelihood of having a rival. State 
sponsorship is associated with a bigger impact, a 9 percent increase in the likelihood of having a 
terrorist group rival. Having an ethnic motivation is associated with a 7 percent increase in rival 
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likelihood. Regarding terrorist group age, each additional year of a group’s existence is 
associated with a 1 percent increase in the likelihood of a group having a rival. State-level 
independent variables, when significant, are usually associated with only minor changes in the 
likelihood of a rivalry. The substantial exception is Civil conflict, which has the largest estimated 
impact of the model. A group in a civil conflict country is expected to have a 21 percent increase 
in the chance of having a terrorist group rival. 
Regarding the alliance dependent variable, shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 1, 
holding territory is associated with a 12 percent increase in the likelihood of a group having an 
ally. Having between 100-999 members is associated with a 21 percent increase in the likelihood 
of having a rival, relative to groups with fewer than 100 members. Religious motivation is also 
associated with about a 21 percent increase in the likelihood of rivalry, making group size and 
religious motivation the most substantively important variables in the alliance model. An increase 
in respect for physical integrity rights in the country a group operates in is associated with a 4 
percent decrease in a group’s likelihood of having an ally. 
 
Inter-field and intra-field violent rivalry 
 Table 2 shows models with the violent rivalry dependent variable disaggregated by 
whether the group has an inter-field or intra-field rival. Territory is statistically significant and 
negatively related to inter-field rivalry, but is statistically significant and positively related to 
intra-field rivalry. One reason this is noteworthy is because in Model 1, with the aggregated 
Violent rivalry dependent variable, the coefficient on Territory was statistically insignificant. 
Results in Model 3 suggest this insignificance might have occurred because the divergent effects 
cancel each other out when both rivalry types are combined. The negative sign for inter-field 
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rivalry might occur because this type of rivalry often involves right-wing or pro-government 
groups, which seem to be less likely to hold territory. The positive sign for intra-field rivalry is 
expected given the discussion earlier, particularly Woldemariam’s claim that territorial issues can 
lead to fragmentation and fratricide among rebels.103 
 Another difference between Models 3 and 4 is that intermediate-sized groups (100-9,999 
members) are negatively associated with inter-field rivalry, suggesting these groups are less 
likely than smaller groups to have a rival. In other words, groups with inter-field rivals tend to be 
small. Meanwhile, intra-field rivalry is associated with groups in the category of 1,000-9,999 
members. Groups with intra-field rivals tend to be larger. The small size of groups more likely to 
have inter-field rivals is consistent with the notion of pro-government groups. The relationship 
between large size and intra-field rivalry is consistent with the idea of resource-rich groups 
drawing enemies. This especially seems likely regarding groups that might compete for the same 
membership base – groups with similar political goals, intra-field rivals. 
 A final distinction is that intra-field rivalry is associated with several country factors 
(Country GDPPC, Democracy, and Physical integrity rights), while inter-field rivalry is not 
associated with any of them. The explanation for all these differences is not clear, but one reason 
why intra-field rivalry might be more likely in democratic countries involves the potential for 
concessions. Democratic governments are often willing to give concessions to militant groups in 
exchange for peace,104 and this can lead to infighting between terrorist groups of the same wider 
movement – particularly regarding relative extremists that are not willing to negotiate.105 This 
could explain the association between democratic regime type and intra-field rivalries.  
 
Domestic and international alliances         
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 Models 5 and 6 have domestic and international alliances as the respective dependent 
variables. There are three main differences. First, State sponsored is associated with international 
alliances, but not domestic alliances. (In Model 2, with the aggregate alliance dependent variable, 
State sponsored was statistically insignificant.) Despite theoretical reasons why state sponsorship 
might be related to alliances generally, it appears there is only a connection between sponsorship 
and international alliances. This is interesting and worthy of future research. The results suggest 
that state sponsorship and international alliances could be seen as complements, not substitutes.  
A second difference is that Groups in country, the count of other terrorist groups in the 
same country, is only associated with domestic alliances. This suggests opportunity plays a role 
in the formation of domestic alliances, but that a crowded market does not necessarily push 
groups toward international alliances. Third, Sub-Saharan Africa is statistically significant and 
negatively signed, suggesting that groups from this region are less likely than groups from the 
Middle East (the omitted category) to have international allies. Overall, the disaggregation of 
violent rivals and allies adds interesting nuance to our understanding of these types of 
relationships.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper presented statistical evidence of connections between terrorist group attributes 
and the presence of rivalrous or alliance relationships. Most of the relationships can be seen in the 
framework of resource mobilization: resource competition regarding rivalry, and resource 
aggregation regarding alliances. Some factors associated with interorganizational rivalry are 
involvement in the drug business, state sponsorship, ethnic motivation, and operating in a country 
with a civil war or a democratic country. Terrorist group alliances are generally associated with 
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controlling territory, moderate group size (100-999 members), and religious motivation. Results 
show interesting differences when rivalries are disaggregated into the categories of inter-field and 
intra-field rivalries, and alliances are broken down by whether they are international or domestic.  
 These findings contribute to the growing line of research seeking to understand a common 
terrorist group behavior, direct engagement with other terrorist groups. These relationships make 
terrorist groups more lethal, encourage and enable dangerous innovation, contribute to group 
longevity, and can harm the peace process between states and relatively moderate terrorist 
groups. Recent research has made important advances understanding rivalry and alliances, 
usually though qualitative and/or dyadic analysis. The current manuscript complements this work 
with its quantitative and monadic focus, confirming some arguments in the literature, but 
challenging others, particularly related to group strength and alliances. 
Limitations of the research should be acknowledged. While the theorized causal 
mechanisms are discussed, these mechanisms are not tested in the empirical analyses. Extant 
theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that the mechanisms are plausible. The manuscript shows 
supportive evidence, but additional research is needed regarding causal mechanisms. In-depth 
case studies or additional quantitative data could provide additional tests. Additionally, the data 
only covers up through 2005, so it cannot tell us about, for example, ISIS as it exists today. The 
sample does include hundreds of terrorist organizations, a broad range of groups of virtually all 
types, but future research should see if the relationships found here hold up in more recent 
samples. 
The manuscript’s findings lay groundwork for continued study of these important topics. 
First, given the explanations of terrorist group relationships, should we take this into 
consideration when studying the consequences of relationships? In other words, perhaps results 
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of extant studies on the effects of terrorist group alliances or rivalries might change if 
relationships are endogenized in a two-stage model. Second, the results suggest some differences 
among ethnic and religious terrorist groups in terms of their propensity to have rivalries or 
alliances with other groups. What other ways can these motivations explain terrorist group 
behavior? 
Third, what can the findings of this paper tell us about the more specific but overlapping 
set of militant groups involved in civil war? Regarding violent rivalry, some of the findings of the 
current manuscript also appear in studies of rebel groups, such as the relationship between illegal 
drugs and rivalry. Some of my other results do not match up directly with those from rebel group 
studies. My results suggest territorial control is not associated with violent rivalry generally, but 
when categories are disaggregated, territory is associated only with intra-field rivalry. This 
contrasts with Fjelde and Nilsson’s finding that territorial control is associated generally with 
rebel group rivalry. Regarding alliances, direct comparisons with the civil war literature are not 
clear cut, but some differences could be further explored. The primary study of rebel group 
alliances is Christia’s book, which examines alliances dyadically. Christia finds relative power is 
more important than ideological motivations for explaining alliances. The present paper finds 
religious motivations are more consistently related to alliance involvement than group strength 
measures are. The monadic focus of this work makes the two studies not analogous in a 
straightforward way, but the apparent contrasts are interesting. Additional research is needed on 
rebel group alliances to better understand their roots, and to what extent they compare to those of 
terrorist group alliances.   
Finally, regarding the notion in the literature and news media that relatively weak terrorist 
groups join alliances, this idea found almost no support. Intermediate-sized terrorist groups are 
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the most likely to have allies, consistent with some less-common arguments in the literature. If 
group weakness explained terrorist group alliances, we would expect the smallest groups to be 
the most likely to have allies. Controlling territory, another indicator of group strength, is also 
associated with alliances. This suggests stronger groups are more likely to have allies. State 
capacity, proxied by GDP per capita, was not associated with alliance involvement, despite 
arguments that groups should form alliances when facing strong states. More work is needed to 
understand the relationship(s) between terrorist group strength and alliance participation. 
However, the conventional wisdom about group weakness and alliances might not be valid, or 
might only apply in certain circumstances. 
Overall, this manuscript has shed light on some factors associated with rivalry or 
alliances, and it turns out group resource measures are consistently associated with one type of 
relationship or the other. This can be a building block for work on related aspects of terrorist 
group relationships. Given the consequential nature of rivalries and alliances among terrorist 
organizations, additional research can contribute to our understanding of the sources and patterns 
of these important relationships.  
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Table 1. Models of terrorist group violent rivalry or alliances, 1987-2005 
 Model 1 
Dependent variable:  
Violent rivalry 
Model 2 
Dependent variable:  
Alliance 
Territory .347 (.478) .763** (.378) 
Drugs 1.120** (.446) .171 (.471) 
State sponsored 1.405*** (.461) -.103 (.356) 
100-999 members -.363 (.563) 1.375*** (.348) 
1,000-9,999 members .309 (.538) -.057 (.448) 
10,000 or more members .600 (.711) .455 (.620) 
Ethnic motivation .991** (.478) .233 (.254) 
Religious motivation -.375 (.438) 1.324*** (.345) 
Age .135*** (.042) .113*** (.019) 
Age squared -.001* (.001) -.001*** (.000) 
Groups in country -.0429 (.0297) .025* (.015) 
Country GDPPC .131*** (.045) .029 (.022) 
Population (log) -.0178 (.180) .009 (.098) 
Democracy .316** (.144) .104 (.075) 
Physical integrity rights -.360*** (.124) -.246*** (.078) 
Civil conflict 3.132*** (1.082) -.0827 (.345) 
Asia 3.138* (1.847) -.236 (1.045) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.745 (1.766) -1.196 (1.020) 
Europe .713 (1.803) -.163 (.850) 
Americas 1.490 (1.756) .003 (.915) 
Constant -10.22*** (2.424) -2.441** (1.062) 
Observations 558 558 
 
Models estimated with logistic regression. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 2. Models of terrorist group violent rivalry, disaggregated by rivalry type, 1987-2005 
 Model 3 
Dependent variable: 
Inter-field rivalry 
Model 4 
Dependent variable: 
Intra-field rivalry 
Territory -1.865** (.906) 1.694** (.670) 
Drugs .942 (.596) .414 (.564) 
State sponsored 1.837** (.777) .978** (.475) 
100-999 members -1.626** (.672) 1.030 (.645) 
1,000-9,999 members -2.022*** (.766) 1.899*** (.680) 
10,000 or more members .089 (.854) 1.332 (.811) 
Ethnic motivation .865 (.616) 1.121 (.684) 
Religious motivation -1.277 (.877) .053 (.472) 
Age .236*** (.066) .093*** (.028) 
Age squared -.004*** (.001) -.001*** (.000) 
Groups in country -.074 (.046) -.020 (.037) 
Country GDPPC .057 (.068) .175*** (.049) 
Population (log) .177 (.217) .092 (.235) 
Democracy .012 (.147) .392** (.172) 
Physical integrity rights -.153 (.196) -.363*** (.138) 
Civil conflict 3.504** (1.779) 3.126*** (1.029) 
Asia .933 (1.693) 1.730 (2.247) 
Sub-Saharan Africa .249 (1.924)  
Europe .177 (2.045) -.389 (2.255) 
Americas 1.012 (2.015) -.481 (2.227) 
Constant -10.80*** (3.377) -13.72*** (3.196) 
Observations 558 531 
 
Models estimated with logistic regression. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Groups from Sub-Saharan Africa drop from Model 4 because none are coded for intra-field 
rivalry. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 3. Models of terrorist group alliance, disaggregated by alliance type, 1987-2005 
 Model 5 
Dependent variable:  
Domestic alliance 
Model 6 
Dependent variable: 
International alliance 
Territory .146 (.338) .644 (.403) 
Drugs -.035 (.402) .983 (.609) 
State sponsored .124 (.326) 1.030*** (.352) 
100-999 members 1.003*** (.328) 1.286*** (.403) 
1,000-9,999 members .269 (.381) .664 (.528) 
10,000 or more members .830 (.532) -.318 (.829) 
Ethnic motivation .150 (.245) -.177 (.365) 
Religious motivation .869*** (.296) 1.591*** (.344) 
Age .075*** (.016) .191*** (.048) 
Age squared -.000*** (.000) -.003*** (.001) 
Groups in country .037** (.015) -.012 (.020) 
Country GDPPC .031 (.0212) -.003 (.030) 
Population (log) -.129 (.105) .006 (.114) 
Democracy .099 (.073) .077 (.088) 
Physical integrity rights -.186** (.072) -.226** (.108) 
Civil conflict .389 (.341) -.733 (.447) 
Asia 1.138 (1.063) -1.064 (1.126) 
Sub-Saharan Africa .220 (1.049) -2.954** (1.387) 
Europe .757 (.892) -.119 (1.036) 
Americas 1.057 (.953) -.557 (1.009) 
Constant -1.615 (1.055) -3.198*** (1.215) 
Observations 558 558 
 
Models estimated with logistic regression. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Figure 1. Marginal effects of variables in Models 1 and 2 
 
Figure shows average marginal effect of variables, with 95 percent confidence intervals.  
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